Peering in from the window ledge of the Union: The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the attempt to bring British Conservatism to Northern Ireland by Coulter, Colin
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cisr20
Download by: [Maynooth University Library] Date: 13 November 2017, At: 08:45
Irish Studies Review
ISSN: 0967-0882 (Print) 1469-9303 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cisr20
Peering in from the window ledge of the Union:
the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the attempt to
bring British Conservatism to Northern Ireland
Colin Coulter
To cite this article: Colin Coulter (2013) Peering in from the window ledge of the Union: the Anglo-
Irish Agreement and the attempt to bring British Conservatism to Northern Ireland, Irish Studies
Review, 21:4, 406-424, DOI: 10.1080/09670882.2013.846689
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09670882.2013.846689
Published online: 12 Nov 2013.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 196
View related articles 
Citing articles: 3 View citing articles 
Irish Studies Review, 2013 
Vol. 21, No. 4, 406–424, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09670882.2013.846689 
Peering in from the window ledge of the Union: the Anglo-Irish

Agreement and the attempt to bring British Conservatism

to Northern Ireland

Colin Coulter* 
Department of Sociology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Ireland 
In this article I examine one particular way in which the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
redefined unionist politics in the late 1980s. While the operation of “direct rule” had 
drawn the unionist middle classes ever closer to Britain in economic and cultural terms, 
it had also left them in a precarious position politically. The nature and scale of this 
political subservience was brought home dramatically in 1985 when the British 
government signed an international agreement giving the Dublin government the right 
to be consulted on Northern Irish affairs. In the period of political flux summoned by 
the Hillsborough Accord, elements of the unionist middle classes were drawn to the 
previously marginal ideas of a small leftist organisation that argued for the British 
political parties to organise in the region. Given the material interests and social 
conservatism of those attracted to it, the call for “equal citizenship” would inevitably 
take the form primarily of a movement seeking to bring British Conservatism to 
Northern Ireland. 
Keywords: Ulster Unionism; Anglo-Irish Agreement; direct rule; Conservative Party; 
British and Irish Communist Organisation 
Introduction 
On 10 October 1989 a motion was placed before the annual conference of the 
Conservative Party calling for membership to be extended to people living in Northern 
Ireland.1 While the demand that Conservative Central Office recognise constituency 
organisations in the region faced stern opposition from the hierarchy of the party, it clearly 
exerted an appeal among the rank and file. Amid euphoric scenes, the controversial motion 
was passed by a resounding majority of delegates gathered at Blackpool – to the 
astonishment of most observers and the dismay of quite a few.2 Persuading the 
Conservative Party to organise in Northern Ireland represented a remarkable political 
achievement. While the campaign to convince the Labour Party to accept Northern Irish 
members had been established in 1977,3 the demand that the Tories stand for election in 
the province was of rather more recent vintage. Indeed, the pressure group that agitated 
specifically for membership of the Conservative Party had been established only eighteen 
months before the eventful Blackpool conference. 
The swift success of the campaign for affiliation predictably inflated the expectations 
of Conservatives in Northern Ireland. As the 1980s drew to a close, many Ulster Tories 
firmly believed themselves to be on the verge of a genuine political breakthrough. The 
handful of elections in which they had stood had seen the Northern Ireland Conservatives 
perform strongly. In advance of affiliation, Tories standing in the local government 
elections in May 1989 had topped the poll in North Down. In the week that followed the 
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National Union’s ratification of the historic conference decision to accept members from 
Northern Ireland, moreover, a Conservative candidate running in a district council by 
election in East Belfast secured 23% of first preferences.4 While these predominantly 
affluent and overwhelmingly unionist5 constituencies were unlikely to provide genuinely 
representative tests of their electoral potential, the Ulster Tories were quick to point to a 
series of surveys of political opinion appearing to indicate that there existed sufficient 
space for Conservative politics to flourish in Northern Ireland. One particular, respected 
opinion poll – the British Social Attitudes Survey – even seemed to suggest that the 
Conservatives might well become the single largest political party in Northern Ireland.6 
As the 1980s drew to a close, then, the movement to bring British Conservatism to 
Northern Ireland appeared – to some eyes at least – to be on the verge of an historic 
breakthrough. In this essay – the first of a pair of articles – I will set out to explain why it 
was that Conservative constituency associations began to appear in the six counties in the 
period of profound political flux summoned by the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In a future 
issue of Irish Studies Review I will return to examine how the meteoric rise of the Northern 
Ireland Conservatives in the late 1980s gave way to their equally swift and ignominious 
demise in the early 1990s. Both articles draw upon two valuable primary sources of 
information. Firstly, the author conducted interviews with thirty Northern Irish members 
of the Conservative Party between 1992 and 1993. Excerpts from these interviews are used 
at various stages to illustrate or underline the issues at hand. Secondly, the essay draws on 
analysis of data generated by the 1989 and 1990 editions of the British Social Attitudes 
Survey. The information on 274 Conservative “identifiers” living in Northern Ireland 
furnished by these two instalments of the survey offered crucial insights that shape the 
discussion that follows. 
The contradictions of direct rule 
The appearance of Conservative associations in the more affluent constituencies of 
Northern Ireland in the late 1980s marked a genuinely unanticipated turn in the political 
life of the region. While invariably dismissed as a mere aberration by political 
commentators, the emergence of the Ulster Tories might in fact be regarded as an entirely 
rational development. The apparent attraction to Conservative politics among elements of 
the unionist community owes its origins in part to the complex set of processes that 
unfolded in the wake of the dissolution of the devolved parliament at Stormont in the 
spring of 1972. If we are to understand the emergence of the Northern Ireland 
Conservatives, we need to appreciate the particular and profoundly contradictory manner 
in which the unionist middle classes experienced “direct rule”.7 
In principle, the dissolution of the Stormont legislature offered the sovereign 
parliament the opportunity to embrace the six counties as an integral region of the UK. The 
perennial conviction that Northern Ireland remains irretrievably “different” from the rest 
of the state ensured, however, that in practice Westminster opted to govern the six counties 
in a manner reminiscent of a distant colonial possession.8 The mechanisms and institutions 
through which direct rule operated were subject to few of the checks and balances that are 
customarily understood as the hallmark of liberal democracy.9 In particular, legislation for 
Northern Ireland was exempt from the established procedures of parliamentary discussion 
and scrutiny and introduced instead through the executive fiat of “Orders in Council” 
devised by politicians whose parties had never even stood for election in the region.10 
The distinctly autocratic form assumed by direct rule engendered widespread 
resentment among unionists in Northern Ireland. Members of the unionist community 
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were often painfully aware that they were in effect afforded rights of citizenship vastly 
inferior to those enjoyed by people living in other regions of the UK.11 This sense of 
alienation was compounded further by the concern that the unaccountable powers afforded 
by direct rule might be used by the British political elite to chart a course injurious to the 
unionist cause. While figures in government often issued assurances that the Union was 
secure, it was all too apparent that Westminster was willing to envisage a future for 
Northern Ireland beyond the boundaries of the UK. The trajectory of British policy over 
the course of the Troubles was guided by the conviction that the metropolis has no “selfish, 
strategic or economic” interest in the six counties and would readily facilitate the wishes of 
people there should they democratically express the desire to live elsewhere.12 While the 
insouciance of the British political establishment towards Northern Ireland remained 
implicit for many years, it would find rather more formal and explicit expression in the 
mid-1980s in the guise of a political initiative we will return to shortly. 
The political form and substance of direct rule served to alienate the professional and 
business classes within the unionist community no less than their poorer ethnopolitical kin. 
The social and economic measures implemented by Westminster, in contrast, proved 
rather more to the liking of the unionist middle classes. Among the principal concerns of 
successive direct rule administrations was the creation of conditions deemed essential to 
weaning people away from political violence. As a consequence, the period would see 
state spending on a range of social and economic matters sustained at levels much higher 
than other regions of the UK. In the fiscal year 1985–86, for instance, public expenditure 
in Northern Ireland was 42% greater than in Great Britain.13 While state spending was, of 
course, inflated by the large security budget, the region also enjoyed funding in key areas 
such as education and housing that was greater than any other part of the UK.14 The 
relative generosity of the direct rule era would allow the creation of tens of thousands of 
new jobs in a public sector that would in effect become the regional economy.15 
In principle, the high levels of spending introduced by direct rule administrations of 
various ideological hues were guided by an ambition to improve living conditions in those 
poor neighbourhoods that had produced most of the combatants in the conflict. It is ironic 
then that, in practice, the main beneficiaries of the annual subvention provided to the 
region by the British exchequer should be the more affluent among Northern Irish society. 
The principal outcome of social and economic policy under direct rule was to create an 
enlarged and relatively prosperous middle class.16 In expanding the public sector, the 
British state created a substantial body of comparatively lucrative and secure jobs that 
would not otherwise have existed. Individuals working in the upper echelons of the civil 
service, for instance, drew the same generous salaries as their counterparts “across the 
water” but were able to buy homes costing only 60% of the UK average and to send their 
children to often excellent schools at typically minimal cost.17 This rather fortunate 
coincidence ensured that senior public employees in Northern Ireland came to enjoy a 
comparatively high level of disposable income which in time would find expression in 
ever more conspicuous consumption. In the 1980s, it became commonplace for 
commentators to observe that the region saw more sales of luxury cars than any other part 
of the UK.18 
The economic reliance of the unionist middle classes on the British state under direct 
rule was echoed in a growing cultural association with public life on what unionists often 
term the “mainland”. In the years after the dissolution of the Stormont assembly, the 
British state became the absolute fulcrum of the Northern Irish economy both as a 
provider of jobs in the public sector and as a guarantor of many jobs in the private sector. 
As a consequence, the organisation of work – especially in the middle and higher 
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echelons of a range of professions – became “integrally tied to British policies and 
practices”.19 One significant expression of this growing association was that it became 
increasingly routine for members of the professional and business classes in Northern 
Ireland to travel to Great Britain for meetings and conferences. In the early 1980s, the 
major airlines acknowledged this emerging market by establishing daily “shuttle” services 
between Belfast and various cities in other UK regions. While these flights were relatively 
expensive, they quickly proved popular among those needing to go to London and 
elsewhere on business. In the period between 1984 and 1988 alone, the number of air 
passages between Northern Ireland and Britain rose almost 40% from 329,240 to 
454,050.20 
The growing familiarity with British society that their working lives bestowed upon 
middle-class unionists was augmented further by destination patterns in higher education. 
In the years before the outbreak of the Troubles, the number of Northern Irish students 
choosing to attend university “across the water” was remarkably small. Indeed, in 1968 
more people from the six counties enrolled in Trinity College Dublin alone (359) than in 
all of the British universities put together (326). Over the next couple of decades, this 
pattern would be reversed and by the late 1980s each autumn would see more than 2500 
Northern Irish undergraduates begin college life in another region of the UK.21 The 
overwhelming majority of these students were unionists from relatively prosperous 
backgrounds and most would not return to the six counties after graduation. Over time, this 
particular trend in higher education would – as we shall witness later – create an 
important autobiographical association that would make many middle-class unionists feel 
rather closer to the rest of the UK. 
These feelings of association that direct rule fostered among the unionist middle 
classes were also nurtured by one further development that is worth mentioning. In the 
period after Stormont was prorogued, the British media and in particular British 
newspapers came to exercise an even more palpable influence within the cultural life of 
Northern Ireland. When Richard Rose conducted his survey of political opinion on the eve 
of the Troubles in 1968, he discovered that only one in three Northern Irish people read a 
British newspaper.22 Over the next two decades, that proportion would double and titles 
published elsewhere in the UK would become more popular than the local press.23 This 
trend was particularly pronounced in the case of more affluent unionists among whom the 
British broadsheets were popular. It is hardly surprising, then, that even though Northern 
Ireland remained “a place apart”,24 the era of direct rule nonetheless witnessed a growing 
interest among middle-class unionists in the issues and personalities that animated British 
political life. 
The steady course 
In sum, then, it would appear that the unionist middle classes experienced direct rule in a 
number of different and ultimately contradictory ways.25 On the one hand, the period after 
the fall of Stormont merely confirmed among middle-class unionists that suspicion of the 
British political establishment they shared with the rest of the unionist community. On the 
other hand, the advent of direct rule had ensured that unionist professionals and business 
owners had come to enjoy a better standard of living and had through their travel patterns, 
familial relationships and reading habits come to have greater knowledge and experience 
of everyday British society than arguably any previous generation. In the years after 
Stormont was dissolved, middle-class unionists were simultaneously being kept at arm’s 
length by the British political establishment and being drawn into the embrace of wider 
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British society. It is this particular paradox that is crucial to understanding the disposition 
and conduct of the unionist middle classes during the period under consideration here. 
The decision to close the Stormont legislature had at the time been greeted with 
virtually unanimous opposition within the unionist community. As the material 
advantages of direct rule gradually became apparent, however, much of this initial 
hostility began to dissipate. The more affluent within the unionist fold in particular 
abandoned their erstwhile commitment to the restoration of a devolved assembly with 
almost indecent haste. The rapid shifts in the outlook and allegiance of the unionist middle 
classes that took place in the 1970s soon found ideological expression in the guise of a 
political enterprise conventionally denoted as “integrationist” but which Bew and 
Patterson26 have persuasively designated “minimalist”. Advocated by senior figures 
within the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and associated most closely with leader James 
Molyneaux, minimalist integrationism insisted that Northern Ireland should continue to be 
governed by Westminster, not least because the restoration of a devolved parliament 
would, under the terms likely to be on offer, scarcely be advantageous to the unionist 
cause. The minimalist position offered a pragmatic endorsement of direct rule but 
advocated that the manner in which the province was governed should be brought in line 
with the standards that prevailed throughout the rest of the UK. According to Molyneaux, 
the cause of democratic reform would be served best not by radical gestures but by the 
patient courting of opinion among the British political elite. In his understated and 
often oblique public comments, the UUP leader seemed to imply that his tireless efforts 
behind the scenes meant he “had the ear” of influential figures in Westminster and 
Whitehall. The events at Hillsborough Castle on the afternoon of Friday 15 November 
1985 would mercilessly expose that particular assumption to have been an exercise in 
self-delusion all along. 
The Anglo-Irish Agreement 
The decade or so that prefaced the Anglo-Irish Agreement witnessed the advance of a 
profound political apathy among the ranks of the unionist middle classes. As the horrific 
events of the early 1970s began to recede, the residents of the province’s leafy avenues 
became increasingly insulated from incidents of political violence.27 The fiscal 
benevolence of Westminster, moreover, allowed the professional and business classes 
in the region to enjoy increasingly comfortable lifestyles. As the political and economic 
climate apparently shifted in their favour, a corrosive complacency descended upon the 
more privileged sections of the unionist community.28 Rather than reflect upon the 
problematic nature of the political environment they had come to inhabit, the unionist 
middle classes opted instead to devote their energies to enjoying their newfound 
prosperity.29 The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement would, however, unceremoniously 
jolt middle-class unionists from their reverie. In the frenetic atmosphere summoned by the 
Hillsborough Accord, many among the unionist middle classes would begin to reflect 
more critically on their political environment and, most importantly, would quickly arrive 
at a clearer understanding of the precarious and contradictory position they had come to 
occupy since the demise of Stormont. 
One of the most dramatic effects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was to highlight the 
deeply autocratic nature of direct rule. In affording the Irish government a consultative 
role in the affairs of Northern Ireland, the British state had alienated the full spectrum of 
unionist opinion. While unionists would express invariably vehement and occasionally 
violent opposition to the Hillsborough Accord, they would be unable to alter the course 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
8:4
5 1
3 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
411 Irish Studies Review 
upon which the Thatcher government had embarked. The advent of the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement brought into stark relief not only that the power that Westminster had come to 
exercise over Northern Ireland under direct rule was essentially unaccountable but also 
that this authority could be used to imperil the Union itself. Central to the significance of 
the international treaty signed in Hillsborough Castle was that it represented perhaps the 
first document to encode the formal indifference of the British state to the constitutional 
status of the six counties. Article 1 (c) of the text, for instance, stated that should the people 
of Northern Ireland indicate a desire to live in another state, the Westminster government 
would be entirely agreeable to facilitating them.30 It is hardly surprising, then, that in the 
days after the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, figures within the unionist community 
were moved to describe themselves as living on the “window ledge of the Union”.31 
The advent of the Hillsborough Accord would bring middle-class unionists to at least 
one further critical political realisation. In so far as the unionist middle classes had 
engaged in politics previously it had been to cast votes occasionally for a party – the UUP 
– that had offered minimalist expression to their latent desire for direct rule to continue 
indefinitely. The UUP leader James Molyneaux had, as we saw earlier, long implied that 
patient diplomacy had begun to win the battle for hearts and minds among the British 
political establishment. The agreement signed by Margaret Thatcher and Garrett 
FitzGerald would, of course, fatally undermine that particular claim. While the political 
crisis summoned by the Anglo-Irish Agreement appeared to demand new directions for 
unionism, the leader of the then largest Unionist party chose instead to adhere to type and 
cling obstinately to the “steady course” that had elevated inertia into something 
approaching philosophical principle.32 The trauma of the events at Hillsborough had made 
many unionists rather more open than before to fresh ideas and initiatives. It soon became 
painfully apparent, however, that anyone interested in original thinking would have to 
look beyond the Unionist mainstream.33 It was this context of intellectual crisis and 
curiosity that would ensure that some middle-class unionists would for a time come under 
the influence of a tiny Stalinist splinter of the far Left. 
The Campaign for Equal Citizenship 
Over the course of the conflict, the British and Irish Communist Organisation (B&ICO) 
had devised and refined a genuinely distinctive reading of the “Northern Ireland problem”. 
In a seemingly endless sequence of densely written publications emerging from the 
B&ICO base in Athol Street in central Belfast, key intellectuals such as Brendan Clifford 
developed an ideological programme that would in time be termed “electoral integration” 
or “equal citizenship”. Although advanced with notorious vigour, the case for electoral 
integration initially made little real impact upon the political culture of Northern Ireland. 
The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement would, however, signal a remarkable turn in the 
political fortunes of the B&ICO. 
In the charged atmosphere summoned by the Hillsborough Accord, many within the 
unionist community were open to new influences in a way that would have been 
unthinkable before. The activists of the B&ICO wasted no time in seeking to bring the 
arguments they had developed over the past decade and a half to a wider and more 
attentive audience. At the mass rally in Belfast convened eight days after the signing of the 
Hillsborough Accord, activists distributed the first edition of a new occasional journal, The 
Equal Citizen. In addition, when the House of Commons sat three days later to discuss the 
Agreement, MPs were already in possession of a substantial, newly written publication 
offering the B&ICO perspective on recent developments.34 This essay, entitled 
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“Parliamentary Sovereignty”, was the first in a sequence of influential pamphlets in which 
the key intellectual Brendan Clifford set out to explain the nature of the crisis and how it 
might be resolved.35 
The interpretation that Clifford advanced sought to depict the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
as merely a symptom of a much deeper malaise.36 The principal source of all the political 
difficulties that faced Northern Ireland was, he argued, the exclusion of the region from the 
party political culture of the UK. After partition, the six counties had been suspended in a 
form of political quarantine with the result that people living there had been subjected to a 
profoundly unaccountable form of government. According to Clifford, it is the effective 
competition between political parties that is the guarantor of genuinely democratic 
governance. Those parties that secure office cannot under normal circumstances afford to 
behave in a consistently autocratic fashion. Failure to accommodate the feelings and 
aspirations of citizens would inevitably ensure a shift in electoral preference that would 
consign the government to the largely ineffectual status of parliamentary opposition. The 
problem that Northern Ireland had faced, Clifford contested, was that this “reflex” between 
government and governed had never existed in the six counties. The exclusion of Northern 
Irish people from the mainstream British political parties had ensured that voters in the 
province had been unable to participate in electing the government of the state of which 
they were nominally citizens. Freed from even the prospect of electoral retribution, the 
sovereign parliament had been able to govern Northern Ireland in an entirely 
unaccountable manner.37 
The particular reading of the crisis initiated by the Hillsborough Accord prompted 
Brendan Clifford to chart a distinctive political course ahead. If the problems that beset 
Northern Ireland were to be resolved, Clifford insisted, the region would have to be fully 
integrated into the party political life of the UK. The advent of “equal citizenship” would 
sound the death knell of unaccountable government in the region.38 Rather than being 
governed as a “colonial condominium” or as “Britain’s Bantustan”,39 Northern Ireland 
would be embraced as an equal and integral region of the UK. Once Northern Irish people 
could join and vote for British parties, they would be in a position to bring about those 
electoral swings that can make the difference between government and opposition. The 
executive of the day would no longer be able to overlook the wishes of voters in the six 
counties as such disregard could lead to ministers being swept out of office. Political 
initiatives such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement that proved deeply unpopular among the 
Northern Irish electorate would simply become unthinkable. 
The realisation of the “equal citizenship” project would, Brendan Clifford continued, 
initiate a complete transformation of political life in Northern Ireland. The stunted and 
sectarian nature of politics in the region was the outcome, Clifford insisted, of its exclusion 
from the wider and more secular party political culture of the British state.40 If the 
Conservative and Labour parties were to run for election in the six counties, there would 
be an opportunity for Northern Irish people to transcend their existing ethnoreligious 
distinctions and begin to embrace political identities other than those conventionally 
designated by the terms “unionist” and “nationalist”.41 Individuals from different 
confessional backgrounds would begin to realise their shared interests and to collaborate 
in their pursuit. In time, the ethnoreligious disputes that have traditionally consumed the 
public realm in the six counties would recede and the principal fault line of Northern Irish 
political life would come to centre on the “real” issues associated with social class.42 
The bold ideological programme that emerged from the ranks of the B&ICO evidently 
struck a chord with many of those looking for new directions and disenchanted with the 
intellectual poverty of the unionist mainstream. In the late 1980s the terms and concerns of 
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“equal citizenship” came to pervade the political culture of Northern Ireland.43 The case 
for electoral integration was advanced primarily by the Campaign for Equal Citizenship 
for Northern Ireland (CEC), a front organisation formed by the B&ICO in March 1986 and 
headed by the charismatic but divisive figure of barrister and Unionist politician Robert 
McCartney.44 The initial strategy adopted by the CEC entailed seeking to win the principal 
voice of Ulster Unionism to the cause of electoral integration. As Arthur Aughey45 noted 
at the time, there was “always something quixotic” about this particular objective. The 
electoral integrationist project was, after all, an attempt to create the conditions that would 
see local parties preoccupied with the traditional concerns of “constitutional issues” 
replaced by British parties dealing with the rather more modern fare of “real” politics. In 
seeking to convert the UUP to the principles of “equal citizenship”, the CEC was in effect, 
therefore, inviting the party to collude in its own dissolution. The inevitable resistance that 
greeted the case for electoral integration would become all too apparent when the 
traditional voice of Ulster Unionism held its annual conference on 8 November 1986.46 
The principal controversy that weekend centred upon two motions advocating that the 
party adopt the principles of “equal citizenship” submitted by Robert McCartney and the 
North Down association of which he was a member. In a heated session from which the 
media had been excluded,47 the leadership brought out a number of influential 
personalities, including the widely revered figure of Enoch Powell,48 to ensure the success 
of two blocking motions insisting that discussion of any new political directions would 
have to wait until the loathed Anglo-Irish Agreement had been defeated.49 
Defeat at the UUP annual conference merely seemed to strengthen Robert 
McCartney’s ambition and resolve. As the profile of the CEC President grew ever higher 
and his criticisms of mainstream Unionism became ever more caustic, senior figures 
within the party inevitably decided to move against him. At a disciplinary hearing held on 
18 May 1987 the charge was levelled that McCartney had acted in a manner “detrimental” 
to the interests of the UUP both by inviting electoral competition from other parties and by 
his very public ridicule of the party leadership. Among the many colourful quotations cited 
as evidence at the meeting were McCartney’s claim that party policy was being “decided 
at the urinals of the House of Commons” and his allegation that the UUP, in league with all 
the other local parties, was content with “Lilliputian sectarian politics where they can crow 
over their own little dung hills.” On the day following the meeting the inevitable 
announcement was made to the media that the controversial barrister had been expelled.50 
The decision to expel McCartney had long since appeared a foregone conclusion and 
evidently did little to diminish his considerable political aspirations. The CEC President 
announced immediately that he would stand in the forthcoming Westminster elections as 
an independent “Real Unionist” candidate on an “equal citizenship” platform.51 
While elections in the predominantly wealthy and overwhelmingly Protestant 
constituency of North Down have traditionally been rather subdued affairs, the contest 
held in June 1987 would prove to be anything but. During the campaign there was a series 
of bitter exchanges between the two principal rivals, Robert McCartney and sitting 
independent Unionist MP James Kilfedder.52 As tempers began to fray, the combustible 
figure of the CEC President was to be heard making claims about the imminent success of 
his campaign.53 When the polls closed, however, this confidence would quickly prove to 
have been ill founded. North Down had seen the third largest swing of the 1987 elections 
anywhere in the UK but James Kilfedder had still managed to retain his seat, albeit with a 
vastly reduced majority.54 While the outcome of the “Real Unionist” campaign would 
ultimately prove a disappointment, there was much from which the CEC might have 
chosen to draw comfort. In particular, the contest in North Down had drawn to the standard 
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of “equal citizenship” a substantial body of activists who transcended political distinctions 
often deemed insurmountable – staunch Unionists had canvassed with erstwhile 
Republicans, Stalinists had rubbed shoulders with Thatcherites, Gay Rights activists had 
found common cause with the more genteel elements of the unionist middle classes. While 
the diversity that sheltered under its umbrella was often vaunted as the principal attribute 
of the CEC, it would also prove to be its undoing. In the year that followed the unity and 
energy of the North Down campaign, the differences always latent within the pressure 
group would begin to tear it apart.55 
The principal fault line that opened up within the CEC inevitably mapped the tensions 
between the two principal centres of power within the organisation, namely the B&ICO on 
the one hand and Robert McCartney and his supporters on the other. The small Athol 
Street contingent – now operating as the Ingram Society56 – contested that McCartney 
had come to exercise excessive influence and had used this to chart a regressive 
ideological course for the pressure group.57 The experience of defeat in North Down drew 
key figures within the B&ICO to the view that the CEC needed to dramatically alter its 
course. If the pressure group were to make a genuine impact on the political culture of 
Northern Ireland, they argued, it would have to abandon the discourse of “Real Unionism” 
and recast itself solely as an inclusive campaign for “civil rights”. A rally held a few weeks 
after the disappointment in North Down offered an opportunity for the CEC to chart a 
rather different course. While the Athol Street group felt that a meeting held in the Ulster 
Hall on 2 July 1987 to mark the first anniversary of the pressure group should be used to 
make the case for the British parties organising in Northern Ireland as a civil right, Robert 
McCartney had other ideas. On the night, McCartney used the platform to denounce the 
cross-party Unionist Task Force on the grounds that its anticipated recommendation of 
power-sharing devolution represented a form of “capitulation”.58 In the eyes of the 
B&ICO, McCartney had squandered a golden opportunity to move beyond the abiding 
concerns of local politics and had instead “immersed the CEC in the squabbles of the 
Unionist Family”.59 
Those who found themselves on the other side of this increasingly acrimonious dispute 
would, of course, offer a radically different interpretation.60 Robert McCartney and his 
supporters tended to dismiss criticisms of his leadership as the petulant response of the 
B&ICO to losing control over an organisation they had originally founded.61 While the 
origins of the fissures within the pressure group were open to dispute, their impact was 
rather more clear cut. Meetings of the executive committee became ever more rancorous 
and the political work of the organisation largely ground to a halt. The divisions within the 
CEC first came to public attention on 4 March 1988 when the often sympathetic News 
Letter ran a story documenting the tensions simmering within the pressure group.62 Eight 
days later, a press release announced that Robert McCartney had resigned as President and 
Dr Laurence Kennedy had stood down as Chairman. These resignations would prove to be 
simply tactical manoeuvres. Both McCartney and Kennedy intended to return to their 
positions once they had been able to sideline their critics. It would soon become apparent 
that the B&ICO harboured similar ambitions. 
The struggle for control of the CEC came to a head at an extraordinary general meeting 
convened on 18 June 1988. Among the matters before the conference was a motion from 
the Athol Street grouping demanding that Robert McCartney be censured on the grounds 
he had “moulded the CEC around his own personality” and that his resignation had 
damaged the organisation in a manner that needed to be acknowledged. That the motion 
was easily defeated revealed the balance of forces in the room and this was confirmed 
when the meeting turned to consider the competitors for the position of President. In a last 
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ditch attempt to recapture the organisation they had founded, the B&ICO had decided to 
run Mark Langhammer against Robert McCartney for the leadership of the CEC. When 
the ballots were counted, it emerged that the former President had been returned by a 
margin of “almost four to one”.63 The re-election of McCartney with such a ringing 
endorsement clearly signalled that he was the ultimate victor in the bitter disputes within 
the CEC. The B&ICO members present reacted angrily by attempting to “wreck”64 the 
meeting before departing to sever all remaining ties to the pressure group and become its 
most vehement critic. 
The emergence of the Northern Ireland Conservatives 
While the B&ICO had given the CEC political direction and much of its intellectual 
ballast, the grouping actually represented only a small proportion of an overall 
membership estimated at 750 people.65 The decision of the infamously combative Athol 
Street sect to depart need not necessarily, therefore, have proved fatal for the pressure 
group. Indeed, the rapid decline of the CEC as a mass organisation might more accurately 
be attributed to the activities of another, rather more “respectable”, element within the 
remarkably broad church of the electoral integrationist movement. Although the demand 
for equal citizenship resonated with a range of people, its principal audience was evidently 
among middle-class unionists disaffected by recent shifts in the political climate. The 
material interests and social conservatism of those drawn to the ideal of electoral 
integration meant that they were in the main “natural” Tories. In the spring of 1988, an 
organisation was established under the umbrella of the CEC specifically geared to 
persuading the Conservatives to extend their operations to Northern Ireland. As the 
Campaign for Conservative Representation (CCR) gathered momentum, many electoral 
integrationists began to channel their energies primarily in that direction and allowed their 
membership of the CEC to lapse. As the decade turned, the CEC, an organisation that had 
once been able to hold meetings in large venues like the Ulster Hall, found that its 
membership was dwindling dramatically and took the decision to recast itself as a “think 
tank”. 
The decision of many erstwhile CEC activists to devote their energies to the cause of 
bringing Conservative politics to Northern Ireland quickly appeared to have been rather 
astute. The CCR ran a slick and thoughtful campaign that emphasised the solid bourgeois 
credentials of its members and evidently struck a chord with ordinary Conservatives 
“across the water”.66 Within eighteen months, the attempt to persuade the Tories to accept 
members from Northern Ireland had borne fruit. At the Conservative Party conference in 
October 1989 a motion to extend organisation to the six counties received an 
overwhelming endorsement from the rank and file, in a moment haughtily dismissed by 
one Tory grandee as a “peasant’s [sic ] revolt”.67 At its meeting the following month, the 
National Union overturned a decision taken the previous year and agreed, albeit with some 
reluctance, to allow the affiliation of Conservative associations established in Northern 
Ireland. In the aftermath of affiliation, many Ulster Tories seemed to genuinely believe 
that they were on the verge of breaking the mould of Northern Irish politics. 
The emergence of the Northern Ireland Conservatives in the late 1980s appeared to 
catch observers of local political life off guard. While often dismissed as a mere 
aberration, the establishment of Conservative associations in certain parts of the province 
might perhaps be more fruitfully regarded as a logical and perhaps even inevitable 
political development. The thesis advanced in this essay is that the rise of the Ulster Tories 
represented an expression of – and an attempt to resolve in political terms – the particular 
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contradictions of direct rule experienced by elements of the unionist middle classes. The 
logic of this argument is borne out strongly when we turn to examine two forms of primary 
data that shed considerable light upon the composition and disposition of the Northern 
Ireland Conservatives. 
From the outset, the socio-economic credentials of the Ulster Tories were quite self-
evident. The spatial distribution of constituency organisations, the accents to be heard at 
public meetings and the occupational backgrounds of the principal party spokespersons all 
served to underscore that the nascent Conservative associations in the province drew 
principally on the talents of the professional and business classes. The characterisation of 
the Northern Ireland Conservatives offered by anecdotal information was confirmed and 
fleshed out more fully by the information offered by the 1989 and 1990 editions of the 
British Social Attitudes Survey. Between them, these polls offered insights into the 
backgrounds and outlook of some 274 respondents who claimed to “identify” with the 
Tories rather than with a local political party. 
The data garnered by the British Social Attitudes Survey confirmed the common-sense 
assumption that support for the Conservative Party was to be found among the more 
affluent sections of Northern Irish society. The Ulster Tories emerged as being distinctly 
more privileged than those who aligned themselves with one of the provincial political 
parties. Conservative “identifiers” were, for instance, one and a half times more likely to 
fall into the highest bracket of income earners (31% versus 20%) and had substantially 
more chance of owning their home (76% versus 61%). This distinctive socio-economic 
profile was confirmed in another opinion poll conducted by Ulster Marketing Surveys in 
January 1990. The company reported that while 16% of middle-class respondents 
(categories A, B, C1) stated their intention to vote Conservative, this proportion declined 
to 6% among unskilled manual workers (D, E).68 The relative affluence of the Ulster 
Tories might be attributed in part at least to the conduct of social and economic policy in 
the era of direct rule. The British Social Attitudes Survey revealed that almost half of 
Conservative identifiers were employed in the public sector (46%) and that these 
respondents were more likely to be employed by the state than people drawn to one of the 
other political parties (40%). We are faced, then, with a remarkable political irony. Even 
though the local Conservatives had benefited more than any other constituency from the 
expansion of the public sector in Northern Ireland, they were nonetheless drawn to a 
political party that had embarked upon the mission of “rolling back the frontiers of the 
state”. 
The data furnished by the British Social Attitudes Survey indicated, therefore, that the 
Conservative associations that sprang up in parts of Northern Ireland in the late 1980s had 
drawn principally from the ranks of the professional and business classes. This was 
scarcely a revelation, of course. After all, the class profile of the Ulster Tories merely 
echoed that to be found in any other Conservative association in any other region of the 
UK at the time or indeed since. In the course of interviews I would invite local 
Conservatives to explore and explain the origins of their relative prosperity. The response 
was often defensive and occasionally even frosty, with interviewees frequently at pains to 
establish that their privilege was the result of talent and, above all, hard work. Once the 
conversation moved beyond the immediately personal and towards the broader macro­
economic context, however, many Conservatives exhibited a rather keener sense that their 
lifestyles might have origins beyond simply their own abilities and industry. When we 
discussed constitutional preferences, for instance, interviewees were quick to emphasise 
the benefits that had flowed from the fiscal benevolence of direct rule. It was an article of 
faith among all of the Conservatives that I spoke to that high levels of public expenditure 
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afforded Northern Ireland a standard of living much greater than that which would obtain 
should the Union ever be sundered: 
Author: Do you regard Northern Ireland’s position as part of the UK as the most beneficial 
constitutional arrangement? 
Interviewee: Yes it is. It is the most beneficial. Our gross expenditure, public expenditure is 
streets ahead of what it is across the water. The biggest problem is that people tend to read The 
Guardian and they say we spend less on hospitals than they do in the rest of Europe, but 
they’re not talking specifically about Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland has got a very 
beneficial situation as regards public expenditure. 
Author: So your reason for supporting the Union would be primarily economic? 
Interviewee: Yes. Economics is what makes the world go around. No bucks, no Buck 
Rogers . . .  69 
The individuals who joined the ranks of the Conservative associations that began to appear 
in Northern Ireland in the late 1980s tended, therefore, to fit a very specific socio­
economic profile. The Ulster Tories were typically professionals, senior civil servants and 
business owners who had come to enjoy a very comfortable standard of living and who had 
a sense that their privilege was in some sense bound up with the fiscal benevolence of the 
British state. When the Troubles were at their peak in the 1970s and early 1980s, these 
individuals had largely disengaged from politics save for casting a vote every now and 
again. While the Conservatives that I interviewed were invariably people with a 
longstanding interest in political matters, the majority of them – seventeen out of thirty – 
had never been actively involved in politics previously. Many of the Ulster Tories had for 
most of their lives resembled the “coasters” identified in Ulster poet John Hewitt’s 
resonant and venomous denunciation of the political indifference of the unionist middle 
classes.70 The event that shook those who would become Conservatives out of their apathy 
was, of course, the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
The political trauma of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
It would be difficult to overstate the impact of the Hillsborough Accord on the entire 
breadth of the unionist community in Northern Ireland. In every single interview I 
conducted with local Conservatives, the advent of the Agreement was recounted as a 
moment of trauma and revelation. During a discussion with an academic who belonged to 
the South Belfast association, the respondent was clearly discomfited by his own reflex of 
emotion as he recalled the significance of events at Hillsborough: 
Author: The Anglo-Irish Agreement seems to have had quite an impact on you. What was its 
effect exactly? 
Interviewee: I know it sounds strange to say this, “devastating” is perhaps an exaggerated 
word, but really quite a profound impact, in all honesty. People say they can remember 
where they were when President Kennedy was shot, and I know this all sounds very 
sentimental, but I can remember the day on which it was signed . . .  I suppose the most serious 
part of the shock, and this still remains, is quite simply the sense of being let [down] . . .  
maybe “betrayal” is too strong a word. But that’s what it felt like, and that’s what it feels 
like still. 
A common thread that ran through interviews with the Northern Ireland Conservatives was 
that the signing of the Hillsborough Accord represented a moment of personal and political 
epiphany. One younger member of the North Down association invoked the metaphor of 
“Plato’s cave” and spoke of “emerging into the light”. While unionists were already aware 
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that they faced political challenges, the Anglo-Irish Agreement brought home more starkly 
than before just how precarious their position had really become. The atmosphere of crisis 
in the mid-1980s evidently impressed upon many the need and indeed obligation to 
become more politically active. While the instinct of middle-class unionists would 
previously have drawn them towards the UUP, for many that no longer appeared a viable 
political direction. The traditional voice of unionism had, after all, been severely 
discredited by the appearance of the Hillsborough Accord: 
Interviewee: [The Anglo-Irish Agreement] gave the lie to what Jim Molyneaux had been 
claiming at the time, that he had the ear of Mrs Thatcher, that there was this supposed 
rapport between the Conservatives and the Unionists . . .  It made me start to think “well 
these guys are our political representatives and they can’t put across the case for Northern 
Ireland being part of the United Kingdom, no ifs, no buts”. They just didn’t seem to be capable 
of doing that and I thought it was time we had a completely different direction. It didn’t 
change what I believe, it just sort of shifted my focus in terms of how I should go about 
things. And that really the Unionist Party was not the vehicle of change I thought it 
might be . . .  
The crisis of mainstream Unionism occasioned by the Hillsborough Accord opened up the 
political space that, for a time, allowed the ideal of electoral integration to flourish. 
The appeal of the equal citizenship project derived largely from the perception that it 
would afford a degree of political influence that the established forces of Unionism so 
clearly lacked. While those who joined the ranks of the Conservative associations in 
the late 1980s were motivated by many concerns, the most prominent and recurrent 
was to secure access to what was the de facto centre of power under direct rule. The Ulster 
Tories genuinely appeared to believe that operating within the party of government 
would enable them to have “their voices heard” and ultimately shape the course of official 
policy: 
Interviewee: How we can convince people that if you want to remain British you vote 
Conservative I’m not sure. I have to work out how you get that point across. There is a 
conception that the harder line Unionist you vote for – Unionist with a capital U – the more 
chance you have of remaining British. When in actual fact the only person [sic ] who can 
assure you of anything is the party of government. Other people can promise you the sun, 
moon and stars but don’t have the ability to deliver because they’re not the government and 
never will be the government in British, Westminster terms. 
While the claims made on behalf of electoral integration may well have been overstated 
to the point of being naive, it remains possible to understand why the project exercised 
some resonance within a unionist community still reeling from the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. The advent of equal citizenship would have ensured that direct rule from 
Westminster would have remained in place for the foreseeable future. The ideal of 
electoral integration clearly accorded, therefore, with the material interests of those 
middle-class unionists who had prospered greatly since the fall of Stormont. Electoral 
integrationists were concerned, however, not only that direct rule would continue but that 
it would be rendered democratically accountable as well. The realisation of equal 
citizenship would, in principle at least, mean that middle-class unionists would 
continue to enjoy the generosity of the British exchequer but would also be able to 
exercise a degree of political influence that had evaded the integrationists within 
mainstream Unionism. The specific promise of electoral integration was, in other words, 
that it would resolve the gnawing contradiction that defined how the unionist middle 
classes had experienced direct rule. It is hardly difficult, then, to understand why the 
enterprise should – for a time at least – have proved so attractive to a certain strand of 
unionist opinion. 
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Cultural assimilation under direct rule 
The electoral integrationist project might be said to have chimed with middle-class 
unionists’ experience of direct rule in at least one further, crucial sense. Over the course of 
the Troubles it became commonplace for commentators to suggest that the unionist 
community had little knowledge or experience of those with whom they assumed kinship 
when they chose to call themselves “British”.71 While these dismissive and often derisive 
readings of unionist identity were always problematic, they would become even more so 
after the dissolution of the Stormont assembly. One of the greatest ironies of direct rule 
was that although it was originally intended to maintain Northern Ireland as “a place 
apart”, the era in fact served in some respects to bind the six counties more closely to the 
rest of the UK than ever before.72 The social and economic policies implemented by 
successive direct-rule administrations unleashed centripetal forces that drew the 
professional and business classes in particular more fully into British public life.73 It 
was in large measure this experience of cultural assimilation that encouraged middle-class 
unionists to become involved in the campaign to bring Conservative politics to Northern 
Ireland. 
In her influential typology of unionist ideology, Jennifer Todd74 identified a central 
strand which she designated “Ulster British”. Broadly secular and liberal in nature, this 
version of unionism articulated a sense of connection with the wider environs of the UK 
and centred upon the rituals and practices of the British state. The characteristics that Todd 
ascribed to the Ulster British were well represented in the cultural and political disposition 
of the Northern Ireland Conservatives. Those middle-class unionists who joined the ranks 
of the Ulster Tories regarded themselves as part of a broadly secular community that 
transcended the narrow ground of the six counties and included the entire UK. This 
burgeoning sense of Britishness75 arose not merely out of an abstract definition of self but 
also out of the lived experience of everyday life. Over the period of direct rule, those 
people who considered themselves Conservatives had come to identify more closely with 
British society because they had gained much more personal experience of it. This trend 
was especially marked in the realm of people’s working lives. The absolute centrality of 
the British state in the Northern Irish economy during direct rule ensured that professionals 
and business owners were increasingly required to make the journey “across the water” as 
a matter of routine: 
Author: What would you say to the criticism that Northern Irish people don’t really know 
British society? Do you have much experience of Britain? 
Interviewee: Well, I was there this week. I won’t be there next week. I’ll be there the week 
after, and the week after and the week after that. I’ll miss a week and then I’m there again. So 
I’m there most weeks on business. 
The burgeoning sense of connection with British society fostered in the world of work was 
augmented by trends in higher education outlined above. Many of the Conservatives I 
interviewed had children who were attending, or had attended, university in other regions 
of the UK. Most of those who went to British universities followed the established 
pattern and never returned to Northern Ireland.76 As the trend towards studying “across the 
water” gathered pace in the 1980s, many middle-class unionists came to acquire strong 
personal bonds with other regions of the UK they might not otherwise have known much 
about: 
Author: It is often said that unionists who calls themselves British don’t really understand the 
British way of life. How would you respond to that sort of criticism? 
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Interviewee: In all honesty, I think that could have been cast up to people twenty years ago. It 
could have been used for the vast majority of the population who in all honesty never travelled 
outside the confines of Northern Ireland. Their holidays were either in Portrush or in Bangor. I 
think now with all the changes that have happened . . .  In my case – when you ask do I 
understand the British way of life – probably now because of travel I’m over there on business 
and my wife’s over there on business. My three children are living over in England at the 
minute. My son is a solicitor in York and he’s been living in England since he graduated. My 
daughter is in London where she graduated. And I now have a second daughter at Bath 
University doing an MSc in computers. So with my connections, the connections through my 
business of being an estate agent where I go across frequently to England for meetings, 
because I’m the Northern Ireland representative for the association I’m a member of. And 
that’s what has happened over the past twenty years. 
The growing sense of cultural association with the “mainland” among middle-class 
unionists was encouraged further by the increasingly pervasive presence of the British 
media in Northern Ireland. It transpired that the Ulster Tories were especially likely to use 
“national” rather local media sources. Some 86% of Conservatives featured in the British 
Social Attitudes Survey opted for a British daily newspaper and during interviews people 
would frequently attest to the importance of the UK media in their cultural lives: 
Interviewee: I suppose I feel more culturally comfortable within the United Kingdom . . .  One 
of the things I do when I get up every day, I buy The Times and I listen to Radio Four. I’m just 
somebody who can’t help but be culturally British. 
The ubiquity of the British media was essential in fostering among those who joined 
Conservative associations in Northern Ireland a sense that they really belonged to the 
wider political culture of the UK. In the course of interviews, the Ulster Tories would 
display a ready knowledge of the figures and issues dominating British politics and seemed 
much more drawn to that realm than the local political scene. 
The unintended effect of direct rule was, therefore, to draw the unionist middle classes 
in particular ever more fully into the broader cultural and political life of the UK. When a 
senior civil servant boarded the early morning “shuttle” to London for a meeting with 
colleagues or a parent spent a few days in Edinburgh to see their daughter graduate or a 
follower of current affairs got up to date with the latest drama at Westminster in the pages 
of The Times, that sense of association with British society was affirmed a little more. Over 
time, the everyday experiences of middle-class unionists ensured that the UK came to 
represent a community that was not only “imagined” but also very real in their everyday 
lives. That sense of association played a crucial role in the genesis of the Northern Ireland 
Conservatives. The Ulster Tories wished to join a community of British Conservatives 
because that was, in the main, precisely what they considered themselves to be. 
Conclusion 
When we examine more closely the various conditions that enabled it, the emergence of 
the Northern Ireland Conservatives in the late 1980s begins, therefore, to appear a rather 
more likely political development than commentators have tended to allow. The 
appearance of Conservative associations in the region might be considered to narrate 
rather well the complex ways in which the interests and experiences of the unionist middle 
classes were recast in the decade and a half after the demise of Stormont. The strategy of 
electoral integration not only chimed with middle-class unionists’ material interests and 
cultural proclivities but also seemed to offer the opportunity of real influence in what was 
an increasingly precarious political environment. It is hardly surprising, then, that the more 
affluent within the unionist community should have been drawn, in particular, to the 
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attempt to bring British Conservatism to Northern Ireland. While the complex sequence of 
processes initiated under direct rule might well have been necessary to allow the 
emergence of the Ulster Tories as an influential political force, it would quickly prove to 
have not been sufficient. Opinion polls often suggested that the Northern Ireland 
Conservatives were on the verge of a political breakthrough, but that apparent potential 
would never be translated into electoral success. In the second of this pair of articles – to 
be published in a future issue of Irish Studies Review – I will turn to examine how the 
unanticipated rise of the Ulster Tories in the late 1980s would give way in the early 1990s 
to their subsequent swift and ignominious decline. 
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